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perceived service equities generated a list of reasons why the plan should be rejected.
This clouded the issue for Defense Department decision makers. Instead, had these same pundits closely examined the mission and the requirements, applied the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test, and eliminated arguments which were based on service parochialism, the U.S. may have saved months in implementing this simple plan to achieve our Nation's goals. This paper briefly details the history of the issue, spells out the proposal, and applies the FAS check. The aim of this paper is to illustrate how quickly "the simplest thing becomes difficult" and present a methodology to apply to future decision making where service interests cloud the issue.
ARE MARINES A BETTER FIT FOR AFGHANISTAN?
"Marine Corps thinkers," to some, these terms do not go together. To as it seemed? The remainder of this paper will examine exactly that. The result will serve as a case study on how senior leaders can evaluate sound strategic proposals using the feasible, acceptable, and suitable (FAS) test and how, in some cases, servicecentric parochial views and a few vocal critics can attempt to obscure a clear solution.
Within days of Shanker's article, the roller coaster of public discourse began.
Everyone from individual Marines to the leadership of the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) had an opinion. What Marines had heard through informal channels as early as July of 2006, was now being publicly and officially espoused by the Commandant, General James T. Conway. The Commandant's commitment to his thinkers and innovators showed as he briefed the idea at the highest levels and even reiterated it in front of the 5 th Marine Regiment at Camp Pendleton, California. Although no decision had been made by the Secretary of Defense, Conway made his case to the regiment as they started their pre-deployment training. 4 His proposal to give Marines the leading role in Afghanistan seemed simple, nonparochial, and motivated by three things: a desire to defeat the Taleban counterinsurgency; consolidate the gains in the Anbar province of Iraq; and reduce the stress on the U.S. Army. Regardless of its apparent simplicity, the idea quickly met skepticism in Washington. Former military personnel and "senior defense officials who requested anonymity" criticized the plan as a thinly veiled ploy to upstage the other services and "get while the getting was good" with regard to the unpopular conflict in Iraq.
Controversy, public debate, and posturing raged throughout the fall. All the while, General Conway's staff continued to socialize their idea and refine the plan set out in As he readied for testimony and the trip to Europe, Gates was once again asked about the Marine Corps' proposal. In a public gathering at the Navy Annex, he acknowledged the idea as it related to NATO's shortcomings and suggested to this small gathering that a decision might be made after his trip to visit NATO leadership in Scotland. 7 Publicly,
Gates had stepped back from his earlier rebuff of the idea saying he had not been presented anything on the "suggestion." This seemed to give General Conway maneuver room to publicly regroup and get back to Gates with more justification. Thus, what commanders in the south lacked was the capability to seize and hold key terrain, then transfer it to the Afghan National Army (ANA). In fact, they needed to be able to accomplish each of the "Successful Practices" from the Army and Marine Corps' recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgencies (see Figure 1 ). 
Mission (U.S./ ISAF)
Countering the insurgency Working with others to expand Afghan governance and promote economic development Capability Required
Ability to seize-hold-transfer key terrain to ANA/ANP Ability to set the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction They conducted their normal military missions of chasing anti-U.S. guerillas or ladrones while also ensuring elections were held, taxes collected, rice and supplies flowed, public works projects supervised, and that the region was gradually stabilized. 18 Next, Marines The reconstruction work of the United States Marine in Haiti provides one of the most thrilling and gratifying chapters in contemporaneous American history…The Marines have literally taught the Haitians how to live decently. Before their coming, sanitation, save in the crudest and most unsatisfactory forms, was unknown; fevers and epidemics were as plentiful as revolutions, a press gang was in vogue and the country was the victim of continuous uprisings engineered by political scoundrels, each of whom ravaged the customs money drawer as each in turn came into short-lived power. The entry of the U.S. Marines ended this sorry story. towns and guaranteeing the safety for every train on the eastern half of the island. 25 In the last half of the century, Marines went ashore "amid soft drink vendors and bathers"
to discourage a rebel coup, secure the Beirut airport, and protect the oil pipelines in Lebanon. 26 In the initial stages of Operation Restore Hope, they occupied the U.S.
embassy, port, and airfield in Mogadishu. 27 And later in Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy, they were charged with securing a beach, the port and airfield at CapHaitien and holding the north of the country until relieved by the U.S. Army. Afghanistan "unsustainable" and admitted they would need to work toward 18 months between deployments rather than 12 if they wanted to train for "the full spectrum of combat." 36 For General Conway, this plan was a "no-brainer" full of benefits for his and other services, and for the Nation. As expected, others with equities and supporters did not see it as so straightforward.
Politically, critics accused the Marine Corps first and foremost of wanting to "get while the getting was good" with regard to Iraq. 37 Pundits suggested Marines wanted to distance themselves from the increasingly unpopular counterinsurgency in Iraq and leave it to the Army. Anecdotally, many of these same critics may have also feared the Marines would be as successful in Afghanistan as they had been in al Anbar. To them, this would leave no doubt which land force was the master of counterinsurgency. 38 This fear can still be heard even after the proposal has clearly been described as additive to Army forces in Afghanistan versus the rumored swap as initially reported. With this claim is the fear resources will be stripped from the Army. Unfortunately, it fails the "long view" look which questions, if the Marine Corps is so self-centered, why would they sign up for a mission which seems to be much more enduring than Iraq and will tax the resources of the Marine Corps for many years to come? It also ignores the strategic rewards to both services of committing more resources to Afghanistan and finishing the mission quicker. General Conway convincingly makes the case for solving these U.S. Lastly with regards to employment, skeptics claim the proposal of the Marines, a single service, taking the lead counters the theme of "jointness" built by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These critics fail to admit a "single service" is in the lead right now and the initial proposal merely supplants one land component for another. As the plan has evolved into a MEU plus a battalion and is additive, U.S. forces actually have increased their "jointness." Additionally, this plan exposes Marines to NATO operations on a much grander scale than in their history. They will benefit from the same kind of coalition exposure as the Army has gained in the Balkans. This latest proposal from the Marine Corps thinkers and innovators provided a feasible, acceptable, and suitable way to achieve both by aiming at strategic goals rather than allowing distracters to focus us on the short-term fight. 
